Eroding Arms Control Regime and US-Russia Relations
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Eroding Arms Control Regime and US-Russia Relations
Annotation
PII
S207054760015919-7-
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Natalia Shapiro 
Affiliation: Primakov National Research Institute of World Economy and International Relations, RAS
Address: Russian Federation, Moscow
Edition
Abstract

Two weeks after Joseph Biden took office as President, the U.S. and Russia extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty for five years. This landmark arms control treaty limits the number of strategic offensive weapons each country can have. A ‘window of opportunity’ for a new stage of strategic stability discussions on arms control has opened. Strategic competition between the world’s most powerful countries, escalating global and regional threats, accelerating technological advances in the military sphere, which hold the potential to have a transformative impact on arms forces and military conflicts, have given added urgency to the bilateral dialogue on arms control between the two nuclear superpowers. Political barriers to a new agreement are significant. The perilous state of U.S.-Russia relations, lack of trust and mutual suspicion make it more difficult for the two powers to have sustainable negotiations toward a new treaty. However, if political will is in place coupled with a realistic approach and the United States’ readiness to address Russia’s concerns, a follow-on agreement could be reached.

Keywords
international nuclear non-proliferation regime, U.S.-Russia relations, arms control, Donald Trump administration, strategic stability, ballistic missile defense, NATO, Joseph Biden
Received
03.06.2021
Date of publication
19.07.2021
Number of purchasers
16
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2950
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S207054760015919-7-1 Дата внесения правок в статью - 14.07.2021
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