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THE HISTORY OF ASEMOGLU-ROBINSON: INSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND THE LIMITS OF AUTHORITARY GROWTH
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THE HISTORY OF ASEMOGLU-ROBINSON: INSTITUTIONS, DEVELOPMENT AND THE LIMITS OF AUTHORITARY GROWTH
Annotation
PII
S086904990000616-9-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Andrey Zaostrovtsev 
Edition
Issue 3
Pages
32-43
Abstract
The article discusses the views of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson on the causes of global gaps in well-being , the nature of development and underdevelopment. The work identifi es the most fundamental moments in their interpretation of historical events, especially their use of the institutional approach to the explanation of human history. It is underlined that Acemoglu and Robinson assign the key role to the division of institutions into extractive and inclusive one, the close relationship of political and economic institutions that is responsible for creating the vicious circle in the case of the extractive, and the virtuous circle in the case of their inclusive nature. It is noted that the authors emphasize the random type of historical development in connection with the accidental occurrence of critical junctures causing institutional shifts. The attention is drawn to the fact that they bind the long- term sustainable economic growth with the presence of inclusive political institutions (democracy) and on this basis do not see any prospects for China to become a global leader.
Keywords
inclusive institutions, extractive institutions, vicious circle, iron law of oligarchy, virtuous circle, critical junctures, institutional shifts, creative destruction, sustainable economic growth
Date of publication
01.05.2014
Number of purchasers
1
Views
1262
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0.0 (0 votes)
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